SCA is in the law. 3DS is in the specification. These essays are about making both work.
A passed 3DS challenge proves the customer answered it, and under the PSR compromise text that would not be enough. An issuer that cannot show the customer its monitoring ran would refund the payment, so what you assessed, and when, becomes the record that matters.
Visa's rules make a cardholder responsible for an agent's purchase as if they initiated it. PSD2 asks whether they consented. A 2024 CJEU case on human proxies suggests what an issuer will have to prove, and the answer runs through the record of what the agent was told.
Four PSR articles with small textual changes and a changed obligation in each. A method for checking the obligations in your implementation plan against the April compromise, using the comparison and following its references.
Connect ChatGPT or Claude directly to paymentslaw.eu and check the sources behind an SCA answer. A free, read-only connection to 51 curated EU payments instruments, with provisions, source editions and citations you can open.
Strong customer authentication is being moved into a directly applicable regulation, not just amended. Your transition plan needs to separate what the text specifies, what waits on the EBA, and what it assumes about the handover. The law leaves that last part implicit.
A May forecast for summer publication has come and gone. The official record now points to December, and carries a status line that reads backwards until you know the procedure.
When an AI agent buys something, how does the cardholder's bank get the cardholder to say yes? The published EMV 3DS specification already has an answer: a 3RI request answered with a decoupled challenge. What is missing is support and settled law.
Six banks say any party holding a potential liability should be able to require authentication. In the EU that is the issuer, yet the published EMV 3DS specification has no field telling its ACS an agent is acting. Which signal should reach the ACS first?
